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Abstract—Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can be used
as a tool for encrypting data, creating digital signatures
or performing key exchanges. In relation to encryption, the
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is the
best known scheme based on ECC, and as such it has been
included in several cryptographic standards. In the present
work, we provide an extensive review and comparison of the
versions of ECIES included in documents from ANSI, IEEE,
ISO/IEC, and SECG, highlighting the main differences between
them that can prevent implementations of ECIES from being
fully interoperable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the development of public key cryptography by
Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [1], several cryptosystems
have been proposed. Security and efficiency are the most
important features to be requested to any cryptosystem and,
in general, both characteristics depend on the mathematical
problem on which it is based. The list of problems that are
currently considered computationally infeasible to solve in-
cludes the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP), and the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
In 1985, Miller [2] and Koblitz [3] independently pro-
posed a cryptosystem based on elliptic curves defined over
finite fields, whose security relies on the ECDLP [4]. In
comparison with other cryptosystems (e.g. RSA), Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) uses significantly shorter keys.
The reason for this fact is related to the hardness of the
ECDLP, which is believed by some authors to be more
difficult to solve than the IFP or the DLP ([3] and [5]).
As it is well-known, an elliptic curve, 𝐸, over a finite field,
𝔽, can be defined by the Weierstrass equation [6], whose
expression in non-homogeneous coordinates is as follows:
𝐸 : 𝑦2 + 𝑎1𝑥𝑦 + 𝑎3𝑦 = 𝑥
3 + 𝑎2𝑥
2 + 𝑎4𝑥+ 𝑎6, (1)
where 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4, 𝑎6 ∈ 𝔽 and Δ ∕= 0, being Δ the
discriminant of the curve 𝐸 [4]. This condition assures that
the curve does not have curve points with two or more
different tangent lines.
In practice, the equation (1) is not used, and the following
simplified equations (in non-homogeneous form) are used
depending on the characteristic of the finite field 𝔽 where
the elliptic curve is defined:
∙ If the finite field is a prime field, i.e. 𝔽 = 𝔽𝑞 , where
𝑞 > 3 is a prime number, the equation defining the
(non-supersingular) elliptic curve becomes:
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥+ 𝑏. (2)
∙ If the finite field is a binary field, i.e. 𝔽 = 𝔽2𝑚 , where
𝑚 is an integer number, then the equation of the (non-
supersingular) elliptic curve is:
𝑦2 + 𝑥𝑦 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏. (3)
The most extended encryption scheme in ECC is the El-
liptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). In this
contribution, we present an extensive review and comparison
of the versions of ECIES included in documents from
ANSI, IEEE, ISO/IEC, and SECG, highlighting the main
differences between them that can prevent implementations
of ECIES from being fully interoperable.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
the functional design of ECIES. Section III provides a
comparison among the different versions of ECIES included
in the ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2, and
SEC 1 documents. In Section IV we offer a detailed list
of the allowed functions in each standard. Finally, we will
summarize the most important findings and conclusions in
Section V.
II. ELLIPTIC CURVE INTEGRATED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
(ECIES)
A. ECIES versions
In 1997, Mihir Bellare and Philip Rogaway [7] presented
the Discrete Logarithm Augmented Encryption Scheme
(DLAES), which was subsequently improved by the same
authors and Michel Abdalla, being first renamed as the
Diffie-Hellman Augmented Encryption Scheme (DHAES)
in 1998 [8] and later as the Diffie-Hellman Integrated
Encryption Scheme (DHIES) in 2001 [9], in order to
avoid confusions with the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). DHIES represents an enhanced version of ElGamal
encryption scheme, using elliptic curves in an integrated
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Figure 1. DHIES functional diagram.
scheme which includes public key operations, encryption
algorithms, MAC codes and hash computations. Because of
the integration of different functions, DHIES is considered
to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks without having
to increase the number of operations or the key length [9].
Figure 1 presents the version of DHIES included in [9],
where 𝑀 represents the clear message, 𝑔 is a generator of
a multiplicative cyclic group 𝐺, 𝑔𝑢 and 𝑔𝑣 are the sender’s
and recipient’s public keys, respectively, and 𝑢 and 𝑣 are
the sender’s and recipient’s private keys, respectively. We
denote by ℰ the symmetric encryption algorithm, while 𝒯
is the MAC code generation function, and H is the hash
function.
DHIES was evaluated by ANSI and included with some
modifications in the ANSI X9.63 standard [10] in 2001.
Independently, IEEE had released in 2000 the IEEE 1363
standard [11], so when ANSI X9.63 was made public, they
reviewed both DHIES and the version proposed by ANSI,
and included a modified version in the amendment IEEE
1363a [12] released in 2004. All these versions of the
scheme receive the generic name of ECIES (Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme), even though the versions are
not identical.
During those years, another ISO/IEC expert group was
collaborating in the creation of the set of standards to be
known as the 18033 family, so they took as starting point
all the previous versions of ECIES and the existing studies
about its security and produced another slightly different
version of ECIES, which was included in the ISO/IEC
18033-2 standard [13] in 2006.
In order to finish this compilation of ECIES versions,
it is necessary to point out a document provided by the
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), an
industry consortium, that included ECIES in the SEC 1
document [14] released in 2000 (version 1.0) and updated
in 2009 (version 2.0).
B. ECIES functional components
As it name indicates, ECIES is an integrated encryption
scheme that uses the following functions:
∙ Key Agreement (KA): Function used for the generation
of a shared secret by two parties.
∙ Key Derivation (KDF): Mechanism that produces a
set of keys from keying material and some optional
parameters.
∙ Hash (HASH): Digest function.
∙ Encryption (ENC): Symmetric encryption algorithm.
∙ Message Authentication Code (MAC): Information
used to authenticate a message.
After comparing the ECIES versions defined by ANSI,
IEEE, ISO/IEC, and SECG, two groups of differences are
clearly detected:
∙ Functionality: Implementation details, usage of optional
elements, binary representation conventions, etc.
∙ Allowed functions: Specific functions (HASH, ENC,
etc.) allowed for their use in each standard.
III. COMPARISON OF ECIES FUNCTIONALITY
In this section, we analyse in pairs the main differences
in terms of functionality among the different standard im-
plementations of ECIES.
A. DHIES and ANSI X9.63 versions
The following list presents the main differences between
the original DHIES specification [15] and the version im-
plemented in the ANSI X9.63 standard [10].
∙ DHIES does not allow arbitrary parameters in neither
the KDF nor the MAC function, whilst X9.63 does
allow parameters in both functions.
∙ DHIES uses a HASH function to produce the MAC and
ENC keys. In comparison, ANSI X9.63 uses a KDF
construction where the data is processed during several
rounds.
∙ DHIES interprets the leftmost bits of the output of the
KDF function as the MAC key, and the rightmost bits
as the ENC key. In ANSI X9.63, the order is precisely
the opposite.
∙ DHIES allows to use as the symmetric encryption ci-
pher either a stream or a block cipher, letting the option
of the specific cipher to use open. In comparison, ANSI
X9.63 only allows the usage of the XOR function.
B. ANSI X9.63 and IEEE 1363a versions
The list included hereafter reflects the main differences
between the ECIES implementations included in the ANSI
X9.63 [10] and IEEE 1363a [12] standards.
∙ ANSI X9.63 only uses the DH with cofactor procedure
as the KA function, while IEEE 1363a allows both
versions with and without cofactor.
∙ ANSI X9.63 allows to use an arbitrary parameter as an
input to the KDF function, but does not mention the
content of that optional parameter. In comparison, the
so-called DHAES mode in IEEE 1363a mandates to2
use the binary representation of the sender’s public key
as an input parameter.
∙ ANSI X9.63 produces the first coordinate of the ele-
ment generated as the output of the KA function, while
IEEE 1363a uses the whole element generated.
∙ ANSI X9.63 always interprets the leftmost bits of the
output of the KDF function as the ENC key, and the
rightmost bits as the MAC key. In comparison, IEEE
1363a interprets the output as 𝑘𝑀𝐴𝐶 ∣∣𝑘𝐸𝑁𝐶 when
using a stream cipher, and the opposite when using a
block cipher.
C. IEEE 1363a and ISO/IEC 18033-2 versions
The following list presents the main differences between
the IEEE 1363a [12] and ISO/IEC 18033-2 [13] standards.
∙ IEEE 1363a allows the usage of parameters in the KDF
function, whereas ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not allow
parameters in that function.
∙ IEEE 1363a includes the option to use either bit or byte
strings, whilst ISO/IEC 18033-2 mandates the usage of
byte strings.
∙ IEEE 1363a suggests to use always the same set of
parameters and functions for a given public key. In
comparison, ISO/IEC 18033-2 mandates not to change
under any circumstance those parameters for the same
receiver’s public key.
∙ IEEE 1363a states that the minimum key length must
be 160 bits. In contrast, ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not
mention any minimum key length.
It is worth mentioning that there were more differences
between IEEE 1363a and the first draft versions of ISO/IEC
18033-2 [16]. These differences were removed in the final
version of the document in order to obtain a higher level of
compatibility with previous standards and implementations.
D. ISO/IEC 18033-2 and SECG SEC 1 versions
The following list provides the main differences between
the ECIES implementations included in the ISO/IEC 18033-
2 standard [13] and the SEC 1 document [14].
∙ ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not allow input parameters in
the KDF function, whilst SEC 1 allows to include
this additional information, even though in the example
test vectors included in the GEC 2 document [17] no
additional parameters were used.
∙ SEC 1 does not explicitly include the sender’s
ephemeral public key in the KDF computation. How-
ever, it mentions that the public key could be one of
the elements that could be used as input parameter in
that function.
∙ ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not mention minimum key
lengths, whereas SEC 1 states that the selection of the
field must be guided by the following requirements:
𝔽𝑞: ⌈log2 𝑞⌉ ∈ {192, 224, 256, 384, 521}.
𝔽2𝑚 : 𝑚 ∈ {163, 233, 239, 283, 409, 571}.
IV. ECIES ALLOWED FUNCTIONS COMPARISON
This section presents the comparison of the allowed KA,
KDF, HASH, ENC, and MAC functions included in the
aforementioned standards, as summarized in Table I, where:
∙ DH denotes the Diffie Hellman key agreement function
and DHC is the Diffie Hellman function with cofactor.
∙ X9.63-KDF is defined in [10], KDF1 and KDF2 are
functions included in [13], and NIST-800-56 is the KDF
concatenation function of [18].
∙ SHA-1 is included in [19], SHA-2 represents the fam-
ily composed by SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512,
SHA-2∗ is the SHA-2 family with the addition of
the SHA-224 hash algorithm, RIPEMD is the set of
hash algorithms defined in [20], and WHIRLPOOL is
included in [21].
∙ TDES is the Triple DES algorithm in CBC mode
[22], AES represents the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard family (i.e., AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256),
MISTY1 is the algorithm specified in [23] and CAST-
128 is included in [24].
∙ DEA is the MAC function specified in [25], X9.71 is
included in [26], MAC1, HMAC-SHA-1, and HMAC-
RIPEMD are defined in [27], HMAC-SHA-2 repre-
sents the family of HMAC algorithms (i.e., HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512)
described in [28], HMAC-SHA-2∗ is the same as
HMAC-SHA-2 with the addition of the HMAC-SHA-
224 function, and CMAC-AES is the set of AES-related
HMAC functions included in [29].
Table I
KA FUNCTION
X9.63 1363a 18033-2 SEC 1
KA DH DH DH DHDHC DHC DHC
KDF X9.63-KDF X9.63-KDF KDF1 X9.63-KDFKDF2 NIST-800-56
HASH
SHA-1 SHA-1 SHA-1 SHA-1
SHA-2 SHA-2 SHA-2∗
RIPEMD RIPEMD
WHIRLPOOL
ENC
XOR TDES TDES XOR
AES AES AES
MISTY1
CAST-128
MAC
DEA MAC1 H-SHA-1 H-SHA-1
ANSI X9.71 H-SHA-2 H-SHA-2∗
H-RIPEMD CMAC-AES
V. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the different versions of ECIES included
in the standards, it is clear that it is not possible to imple-
ment a software version compatible with all the standards,
regarding both the specific operations and the list of allowed
functions and algorithms. In addition to this, implemen-
tations may face another important problem, which is the3
limitation in the functions available to the developer in the
programming interface of the target device.
The direct consequence is that, when implementing
ECIES, the first step should be to evaluate the capabilities
provided by the final platform and, from that point, decide
which version of ECIES to implement. Regarding this point,
even though the newer versions (e.g. ISO/IEC 18033-2 and
SEC 1) may not be fully compatible with legacy devices,
they provide access to the most recent and secure functions
(e.g. SHA-2, AES, etc.), so it should be recommended to
use one of these versions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work has been partially supported by Ministerio de
Ciencia e Innovacio´n (Spain), under the grant TEC2009-
13964-C04-02, and Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Com-
ercio (Spain), in collaboration with CDTI and Telefo´nica
I+D, under the project Segur@ CENIT-2007 2004.
REFERENCES
[1] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 22, pp. 644–654, 1976.
[2] V. S. Miller, “Use of elliptic curves in cryptography,” Lecture
Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 218, pp. 417–426, 1986.
[3] N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems,” Math. Comp.,
vol. 48, pp. 203–209, 1987.
[4] A. J. Menezes, Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems.
Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
[5] BSI TR 03111, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Bundesamt fu¨r
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2009, http://www.bsi.
de/literat/tr/tr03111/BSI-TR-03111.pdf.
[6] J. H. Silverman, The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves, ser. Grad-
uate texts in Mathematics. New York, NY, USA: Springer-
Verlag, 1986, vol. 106.
[7] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, “Minimizing the use of random
oracles in authenticated encryption schemes,” Lecture Notes
in Comput. Sci., vol. 1334, pp. 1–16, 1997.
[8] M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, and P. Rogaway, DHAES: An
Encryption Scheme Based on the Diffie-Hellman Problem,
contribution to IEEE P1363a, 1998, http://grouper.ieee.org/
groups/1363/P1363a/contributions/dhaes.pdf.
[9] ——, DHIES: An encryption scheme based on the Diffie-
Hellman Problem, unpublished, 2001, http://www.cs.ucdavis.
edu/∼rogaway/papers/dhies.pdf.
[10] ANSI X9.63, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, American National Standards
Institute, 2001.
[11] IEEE 1363, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptog-
raphy, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2000.
[12] IEEE 1363a, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryp-
tography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2004.
[13] ISO/IEC 18033-2, Information Technology – Security Tech-
niques – Encryption Algorithms – Part 2: Asymmetric Ci-
phers, International Organization for Standardization / Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission, 2006.
[14] SECG SEC1, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, ver. 2, 2009, http://www.secg.
org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf.
[15] M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, and P. Rogaway, “The oracle Diffie-
Hellman assumptions and an analysis of DHIES,” Lecture
Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2020, pp. 143–158, 2001.
[16] V. Shoup, A Proposal for an ISO Standard for Public Key
Encryption, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2001/112,
2001, http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/112.pdf.
[17] SECG GEC 2, Test Vectors for SEC 1, Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group, 1999, http://www.secg.org/download/
aid-390/gec2.pdf.
[18] NIST SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-wise Key Estab-
lishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005.
[19] NIST FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard, National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002.
[20] H. Dobbertin, A. Bosselaers, and B. Preneel, “RIPEMD-
160: A strengthened version of RIPEMD,” Lecture Notes in
Comput. Sci., vol. 1039, pp. 71–82, 1996.
[21] ISO/IEC 10118-3, Information Technology – Security Tech-
niques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated Hash-functions,
International Organization for Standardization / International
Electrotechnical Commission, 2004.
[22] ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption: Modes of Operation,
American National Standards Institute, 1998.
[23] M. Matsui, Specification of MISTY1 - A 64-bit Block Cipher,
proposal sent to NESSIE, 2000.
[24] C. Adams, RFC 2144 - The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm,
Internet Engineering Task Force, 1997, http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc2144.txt.
[25] ANSI X9.19, Financial Institution Retail Message Authenti-
cation, American National Standards Institute, 1996.
[26] ANSI X9.71, Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code,
American National Standards Institute, 2001.
[27] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, RFC 2104 - HMAC:
Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication, Internet Engi-
neering Task Force, 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[28] NIST FIPS 198, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, 2002.
[29] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology, 2005.4
